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**MEDIA BETWEEN STATE, LAW AND SOCIETY
DURING INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS.
PART TWO: WORLD WAR I, THE CENTRAL POWERS**

Андрій Самотуга. Рікардо Фурфаро. МЕДІА МІЖ ДЕРЖАВОЮ, ПРАВОМ ТА СУСПІЛЬСТВОМ ПІД ЧАС МІЖНАРОДНИХ ЗБРОЙНИХ КОНФЛІКТІВ. ЧАСТИНА II: ПЕРША СВІТОВА ВІЙНА, ЦЕНТРАЛЬНІ ДЕРЖАВИ. Здавна відомо, що війна ведеться не лише на полі битви класичною зброєю. Вона водночас не менш жорстоко відбувається за думки й душі людей в інформаційно-культурній та духовно-психологічній царині.

Зважаючи на постійні дискусії щодо співвідношення між мораллю та об'єктивністю в журналістиці, між дотриманням конституційного суб'єктивного права на інформацію (що включає такі похідні права, як свобода вираження поглядів і переконань, право отримувати, створювати, зберігати, поширювати, знищувати та спростовувати інформацію) автори досліджують еволюцію академічної дискусії навколо зв'язку медіа та збройних конфліктів, особливо у контексті появи та розвитку новітніх інформаційно-комунікаційних засобів і платформ.

Ця стаття продовжує цикл публікацій, що висвітлюють проблеми обмеження права на інформацію, протидії ворожій пропаганді та просування власних ідеологем і нарративів як елементів контрпропаганди. Адже нинішні інформаційні війни як складові гібридних характеризуються битвою вже не стільки фактів, скільки сенсів і нарративів, що майже не спростовуються протиборчими сторонами, а отже, все менше підпадають під правове регулювання, а більше – під політичні кон'юнктури. Значну увагу приділено питанням медійної цензури під час війни. Часові постановки наукової проблеми охоплюють період від Першої світової війни як першого міжнародного збройного конфлікту за кількістю держав-учасників до наших днів – російсько-української війни як предтечі нового протистояння між авторитарними режимами і демократичним світом.

На прикладі Центральних держав (Німечка, Австро-Угорська та Османська імперії) авторами зроблено висновок, що Перша світова війна, за відсутності тоді міжнародно-правового обмеження суб'єктивного права на інформацію аж після закінчення Другої світової війни, започаткувала подальшу із наростанням участь державних і недержавних суб'єктів у реалізації інформаційної політики як у міжвоєнні періоди у формі гібридних війн, так і відкритий збройних протистоянь у контексті всіх етапів інформаційної революції. Особливістю інформаційної політики аналізованих держав, на відміну від розглянутих у попередній статті (Велика Британія, Франція, США), визначено те, що вони, будучи суходольними імперіями, стикнулися з низкою складнощів, зумовлених передовсім своїм поліетнічним складом, що врешті-решт призвело до їх поразки та розпаду на окремі держави як одного з головних підсумків цієї війни.

Ключові слова: *медіа, Перша світова війна, Центральні держави, суспільство, цензура, пропаганда, обмеження права на інформацію.*

Relevance of the study. Informational aggression has become our everyday life, and no one is able to protect himself from its negative influence alone. Anyone who is in the vortex of

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information confrontations must be aware of possible risks and be able to resist information threats and influences. Therefore, he should be able to know the reasons and methods of waging wars of this type. At the same time, information wars are no less destructive than those in which conventional weapons are used. Hence, discussions around information wars are impossible without both retrospective superficial reviews and in-depth analyses, thanks to which it is possible to understand the essence, nature and possible future transformations of this phenomenon.

For many centuries, and even millennia, the world political map has changed many times, including as a result of information conflicts. During the 20th century in the international arena, as many as three powerful testing grounds of information weapons were successively deployed – during the First, Second World Wars and the «Cold War». It is at the moment of aggravation of international relations that the propaganda machine is put into full force. The importance of propaganda as the main tool of information confrontation increases significantly in wartimes, as it is not inferior in its influence, and in some cases exceeds the effectiveness of weapons. During the First World War similar methods and technologies were often tested for the first time in full-scale sense.

At the same time, measures of counter-propaganda and censorship, which became extremely important during the war and were carried out by the warring parties (blocs of states) – the Entente and the Central Powers, both with the presence of features common to them, and differences that were determined by the different nature of the forms of government (monarchy, republic) and administrative-territorial system (mostly empires with a distinction between maritime and land (continental ones)).

In the initial publication of this series of articles, we have considered the peculiarities of the information policy of the Entente countries (Great Britain, France, Russia) and its associated member, the United States [24]. At the same time, Russia, despite its membership in this military-political bloc, cannot fit into such a defining construction as overseas possessions, but on the contrary, it is a classic example of a land-based multi-ethnic empire, which was characteristic of another union – the Central Powers, to which the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires belonged. So, this second article will deal with peculiarities of the military information policy of the Central Powers, as well as on the differences between their separate empires, in particular, between their provinces, which later became independent states.

Recent publications review. As we noted in the previous article [24, p. 36], in Ukraine, the subject of information policy in general and military history, in particular, covers mostly the fields of political and historical sciences, while the legal field is naturally represented by works on theory and history of state and law and constitutional law. These and other problems are discussed in scientific publications by such Ukrainian authors as V. Zhadko, Ya. Zharkov, M. Kondratyuk, S. Kost', A. Mosiyenko. In 2003, S. Harkavy made a partial historical and legal study of the issues of propaganda during the First World War.

A similar topic is also covered in many foreign social and political publications by such authors as M. Robbins, V. Ther, K. Eimermacher, J. Horne & A. Kramer, M. Jeismann, M. Koch-Hillebrecht, S. Müller, A. Reimann, H. v. Gerlach, L. Boka and others.

Taking into account the superficial coverage of the legal aspects of the military information policy in Ukrainian science, it is the foreign developments of the analyzed topic that require additional research.

The objective in this research paper is to find out the peculiarities of information policy implementation during the First World War by the Central Powers (in particular, compared to the Entente countries) through the application of its restrictive measures in the form of a caesura, its legislative support with the definition of the circle of its actors and the subsequent impact on the development of the international security system.

Discussion. As the European political leaders later recognized, the Great French Revolution led to the fact that public opinion, expressed through agitation and action, turns into a significant political force that can no longer be ignored or simply controlled through censorship [22, p. 54]. For his part, the Austrian playwright Stefan Zweig, who during World War I served in the archives of the Austro-Hungarian War Ministry and eventually became a pacifist commenting on that war, argued that in order to continue the war, which had lasted for four terribly long years, states had to find ways to transform popular mass feelings such as hatred, anger, and the will to fight into more intense and long-lasting passions, and that this required the invention of a «terrible science» called propaganda. Propaganda was not really a product of the Great War (as World War I was then called because it was believed to be the

only and last one). However, the war propaganda produced between 1914 and 1918 differed from similar activity in earlier wars in two respects. Firstly, during that period, propaganda was organized for the first time in a «scientific way» (primarily using the achievements of psychology and the development of its social direction). Secondly, the Great War was the first total war in which all belligerent powers resorted to propaganda as a means of reaching all sections of society to obtain popular «consent». In general, propaganda has become the main political weapon not only to justify war, but also to mobilize hearts and minds [11].

During the First World War, both the Entente and the Central Powers made extensive use of propaganda, which took many forms, from books, newspaper articles and posters to film and photography. Propaganda emphasized the «line» of the government and exposed the shortcomings of a particular enemy. During the Great War, both sides imposed strict censorship and official licensing of military intelligence. One of the examples of censorship was the interception of letters sent home from the frontline. The content was checked not only for military secrecy, but also for any negative comments about the morale of the troops. That is, propaganda and censorship went hand in hand.

We should note that the First World War actually coincided with the next stage of the information revolution – the invention of audiovisual media. Among them, photography and cinematography were more stationary than mobile ones and therefore could not be widely available at the frontlines. For example, cameras at that time had large dimensions, in which, instead of roll film, photographic plates were still used with long exposure on tripods (which forced reporters to climb out of trenches, placing themselves and soldiers to danger), and which made it impossible to quickly photograph events, in particular, from long distances and in the darkness. Other media invented at that time – the telegraph and the telephone – made it possible to transmit information over long distances. However, wire communication was also vulnerable to damage, as happened when Great Britain cut German cables in the North Sea, securing a monopoly on the transmission of war propaganda information to the United States. Being exclusively state-owned, the telegraph and telephone were used as the only means of information transmission for newspaper editorial offices, and therefore access to these communication means was strictly regulated, which can be considered one of the censorship elements.

Therefore, in this publication, we will focus primarily on the printed media as an object of censorship and a propaganda means, which was carried out during the First World War by the Central Powers as well as by the Entente countries. Moreover, to promote a certain agenda, political decision-makers sought to actively influence public discourse, initially mainly through the press [28, p. 54].

We will begin the analysis of the information policy of the Central Powers with Germany. For example, in his diary entry for August 12, 1915, British General D. Heig demonstrates his attitude to the censorship of the German army. He pokes fun at what he sees as the Germans' heavy-handed approach to censorship, even though the British behaved in a very similar way. «The German prisoners of war order states that men are not allowed to write home about the heavy losses the Bavarians have suffered. If this continues, letters sent home will be stopped! This is all part of the German government's plan to mislead the German people» [15].

That is, already in the second year of the war, the European press received numerous censorship instructions, of which there were about two thousand in Germany. Central censors in the Central Powers, in general, were mainly military personnel, unlike the Entente countries with civil servants. To «ease» the journalists' work, the authorities issued special «censorship books» with a list of restrictions, which, of course, were classified and were unavailable to the public. But over time, the instructions became more blurred, and something forbidden could be found at will in any material [3].

The organization of censorship was somewhat modified during the war. In some countries, censorship bodies later lost their autonomy. Just as in such an Entente country as France, in Germany, they were combined with propaganda departments – in October 1915, in the Kriegspresseamt (Military Press Bureau). In addition, the various Reichsämtler (imperial offices) and other civil authorities there had their own censorship offices.

In Germany, the state authorities had a decisive influence on censorship. Germany, with the exception of Bavaria, was subject to fifty-seven military commanders, who, only nominally governed by the Kaiser, assumed executive power in their districts. Considering the Press Instructions of the Military Press Office in Berlin as only guidelines, they arbitrarily decided

which censorship measures should be carried out either by subordinate commands or by the local police. Bavaria was also ruled by six military commanders, who, however, were strictly subordinate to the Bavarian Minister of War and had to carry out censorship according to his instructions. The Bavarian military press service subordinated to him also usually used his support and caused numerous disputes not only with the Berlin censorship, but even with the Supreme High Command [15].

With regard to newspaper censorship, in Germany, with the exception of Bavaria, blank newspaper columns were banned from removing censored articles, as ordinary people should not know that all information was censored. German censors also gave recommendations such as «undesirable», «should be avoided», «publish with caution» or even «preferred». Since the censors also controlled publication afterwards, it was always safer, at least in sensitive matters, to submit an article in advance. Otherwise, one can be subject to sanctions of varying degrees. The publication of the newspaper could be suspended: if, for example, in France – up to six months, then in Germany – for a few days [14, p. 103]. In case of repeated offenses, «cautions» or «severe warnings» could be issued, editors were summoned to censorship institutions, or preventive censorship was regularly introduced. As a last resort, a newspaper's circulation could be confiscated and suspended indefinitely, and journalists could be banned from writing or even prosecuted. If, for example, in France, editors of opposition newspapers were imprisoned or executed, then in Germany violators of the censorship regime were forced to emigrate in the worst case, such as pastor Johannes Lepsius because of his forbidden report on the atrocities of the Turkish allies against Armenians.

Against the background of food shortages in Austria and Germany, culminating in the «turnip winter» of 1916-1917, the German military press service issued five instructions to the press regarding the food situation: Journalists were asked to avoid sensational reports about high food prices and attacks on traders and shopkeepers, reports of food riots or disturbances in front of shops and even jokes about food shortages. The censorship code of 1917 allowed information about food problems only at the local level and forbade inciting reports about food riots and conflicts between peasants and townspeople [23, p. 242].

In Germany, along with food, censorship was also introduced on such topics as speculations about the future constitution of Alsace-Lorraine, news about deportations from occupied territories, articles about the Kaiser, the already mentioned Turkish atrocities, and all illustrations were to be submitted to preventive censorship [23, pp. 195, 264]. There were also official exemptions from censorship. With the exception of newspapers of a seditious nature, newspapers could be bought from abroad, particularly from enemy countries, enemy army communiqués could be printed, and reports of the stormy sessions of the Reichstag and Bavarian Landtag were not censored. Despite careful monitoring of the activities of pacifists, some of them could secretly or openly spread their propaganda [23, p. 202].

Regarding the censorship of military correspondence with their civilian relatives, in Germany, as in Austria-Hungary and Italy, soldiers could be punished and even court-martialed for letters that allegedly contained «exaggerated and false information.» To avoid control, soldiers in all armies preferred to be careful in their correspondence and sometimes asked comrades on leave to send their letters when they were transitionally at home, but in the German army such voluntary «postmen» were sometimes controlled in trains and severely punished [27, p. 217-219].

Along with censorship as a restriction on the right to information, the Germans, for their part, were as enthusiastic as the British people about propaganda through the use of posters, leaflets and other visual means (advertisements) with the primary aim of demonizing the enemy and glorifying their own troops. However, the concept of propaganda turned out to be much more complicated than censorship. According to some British authors, where some prominent historians preferred to consider propaganda and censorship through the paradigm of a «culture of war» and others discussed propaganda in terms of coercion, few German researchers managed to carry out a detailed analysis of the wide range of responses to the war of 1914-1918 to show that neither patriotic perception nor violent refusal and dissent dominated the war propaganda [13].

However, starting from 1918, i.e. at the end of the war, German propaganda began to weaken, in particular in terms of demonizing the enemy, so as not to provoke panic among its own population. Thus, German censorship hid leaflets with aggressive slogans such as «Jeder Stoß ein Franzos» («Every blow to the Frenchman»), a sketch in a circus about the Belgian Francs and German repression, and the shameful undressing of a French governess in a stage

performance.

According to some German researchers, war propaganda was not a phenomenon that suddenly arose in 1914 and ceased to exist in 1918. The fact that many Germans were ready to heed the Kaiser's call to arms both literally and ideologically, stemmed from ancient national ideals and beliefs. Long before the start of the war, significant sections of the bourgeois society of Germany recognized obedience, unquestionable loyalty, bravery and discipline as the main characteristics of an ideal monarchist subject [6, p. 187]. As other authors note, this elevation of military values to social landmarks paved the way for Germany to mobilize [26].

Immediately after mobilization, public discourse in Germany was largely determined by popular war propaganda: journalists, intellectuals and artists, as well as ordinary Germans, sought to convey their interpretations of the conflict through favorable articles about the war or letters to the editor [22, p. 464]. However, only one specific aspect of wartime propaganda later proved to be extremely effective in the long run, to the detriment of the Weimar Republic, which had consciously defined itself in opposition to wartime values. The censorship practice of concealing Germany's political and military mistakes and the nature of Germany's defeat burdened the new state with the myth of a backstab and left it unable to answer either the question of war guilt or the peace negotiations with rational, factual arguments. This failure to truly expose Germany's wartime behavior allowed the republic's right-wing opposition to undermine its legitimacy by reviving wartime propagandist ideals as an alternative to revolutionary unrest and uncertainty [26].

If Germany during the war was mainly a mono-ethnic and mono-linguistic empire, owning Prussia and hatching plans to conquer mainly the lands in the east – the Baltic countries, Belarus and Ukraine, then its satellite in the south is poly-ethnic, but with dominance in the official use of the German language, the *Austria-Hungarian Empire* was marked by no less, and in some places even more, strict censorship. Just as in Germany, it was carried out in the military department by personnel officers. However, given the multi-ethnic composition of the empire, the propaganda and the censorship had its own peculiarities in a specific territory.

In Austria, censorship and propaganda were combined from their start in the *Kriegspressequartier* (Military Press Service) under the War Ministry, with two separate supervisory commissions for Austria and Hungary. However, the *Kriegspressequartier* was only responsible for censorship in war zones, while two other bodies, the *Kriegsüberwachungsamt* (War Surveillance Office) in Vienna and the *Kriegsüberwachungskommission* (War Surveillance Commission) in Budapest, looked after the Austrian and Hungarian territories respectively. In Austria, the *Kriegsüberwachungsamt* was replaced by a commission of the War Ministry in October 1917 [9].

Regarding the protest against censorship in the press, some Austrian newspapers filled the blank spaces with the word «Zensur» [17, p. 134]. As for postal control, civilian letters to soldiers in which they mentioned the lack of food and hunger were confiscated, so as not to «endanger the discipline of the front-line troops and negatively affect their morale» [17, p. 85].

In Austria, censorship became more softened under Emperor Karl I (1887-1922), as he reconvened the Austrian parliament, the *Reichsrat*, resulting in highly critical statements and speeches appearing in the newspapers on behalf of various Slavic nationalities that did not managed to suppress [17, p. 140]. Even parliamentary debates, as well as in Germany, were not subject to censorship.

Also of great interest for our research is the military information policy of such an important part of this empire (also based on its name) as Hungary. In this regard, some Hungarian researchers pointed out to some specific features of Hungarian, and not, in general, Austro-Hungarian propaganda during the World War I. A certain independence of Hungary's information policy was determined by the fact that it shared the status of a metropolis with Austria and thus enjoyed greater autonomy in contrast to other lands constituting the empire.

It was in Hungary that military leadership was less successful in gaining long-term and complete control, primarily due to the steadfast resistance of the Istvan Tisza's government. Innumerable examples can be cited of how the Hungarian government, in order to protect its citizens, opposed military leaders of various ranks and, under the strictest law defining the authorities' special duties, refused those officers who were to exercise undue powers over civilians. In a certain respect, it was the government of I. Tisza that prevented Hungary from approaching a military dictatorship similar to the one established in Austria [8, p. 28].

In Hungary, as it should be, in July 1914, mass mobilization also began; war propaganda was popularized throughout the country by posters of advertising agencies (for

example, the Advertising Company of the Capital, which owned advertising columns in Budapest). For several months, entertainment theaters showed propaganda plays to full capacity. The majority of Hungarian political newspapers supported calls for revenge against Serbia as early as August 1914. Although even then some print media expressed objections, in particular the «Huszadik Szazad» («The Twentieth Century») and «Vilag» («The World»), associated with the opposition parties and politicians. Critical voices, however, were overwhelmed by strong state control and censorship of press publications. In July 1914, Act XLIII of 1912 had just come into force, giving the government extraordinary powers in case of war, including censorship and supervision of the press, distribution and regulation of printed matter. Newspapers were required to submit copies for state control, which was carried out by censorship services managed by the Crown Prosecution Service. Censors issued «confidential» or «strictly confidential» prohibitions and prescriptions to editorial offices; in more exceptional cases, all copies of a particular issue could be confiscated. An excellent example of rules arising under the influence of censorship-induced expectations is a censored copy of a manuscript preserved in the conservative-nationalist daily newspaper «Budapesti Hirlap» («Budapest Courier») which contained a note that «8 orai Ujsag» («The eight-hour newspaper») published the news, «without submitting it to censorship, therefore measures will be taken against it!» If we recall the former manner of speech of the Hungarian novelist Mor Jokai, the sixth branch of power, i.e. the press, was held hostage by the seventh, i.e. censorship.

Accordingly, the free expression of views contrary to the goals of propaganda in any official media was effectively made impossible. In the space delineated by censorship, the ever-increasing shortage of paper caused another means of controlling the distribution of the press, especially after 1917. Namely, it was relatively easy to provide only those printed media with raw materials that continued to line up in favor of or in war cause [8, p. 76].

At the same time, the discrepancy between the stories of soldiers and other survivors of the trenches horrors of and the official slogans, became increasingly apparent, as darker anxieties overshadowed the early impetus of the great «adventure.» Initial hopes for a «lightning war» faded as hostilities continued and even intensified; strategic losses in the fall of 1914 caused «a certain undeniable depression in public sentiment,» which «reached a climax with the news of the Russian invasion of the Carpathians.» After hearing all this, «even the most determined optimists could no longer maintain their relentlessness, and if they could, it was actually just an artificial, restrained optimism, from under which cold fear screamed» [25, p. 363].

Moreover, since the spring of 1915, propaganda slogans, as well as the manipulation of media messages, have been openly discredited. Among the authors of the literary magazine «Nyugat» («The West»), Arthur Elek and others objected to the falsehood of military reports, and A. Elek noted memoirs and private documents or personal diaries as the only documents of the era worthy of trust for posterity. Many people turned to the magazine genre precisely because of knowledge of censorship or in order to personally honor the memory of the war [12, pp. 88-92].

The pacifist voices, rather sparse at the beginning but increasingly realistic as time went on, shared an evocative, suggestive and ultimately complicit acoustic context, especially from 1916 onwards, making many things straightforward, contrary to the propaganda of the time: «this war developed its lingua franca*, which was sometimes similar to vulgar Latin, allegory poetry» [20, p. 9].

But militarism and belligerence still permeated the entire society thanks to central propaganda. As for the everyday forms of inhumanity and indirect madness of the authorities, as the Hungarian writer, journalist, translator Dežio Kosztolányi observed in 1917, «one can meet angry little tyrants everywhere. Tyrants are the waiters, the conductress, the bath servant, the caretaker. In this age, when man is less than nothing, the little ones - wondrous as it is that it should be them - suffer from a lunacy of power, prancing day and night with anger on their own dunghills. The poor attack each other with their bare hands. Today the conductress wages war on widows and orphans. What has perished, free will and individual life, is now receiving the coup de grace, from those who have lost the most. The last battle of the World War. I remember, at the beginning of the war, one insisted that war means order, nothing else would happen but the restoration of order. I have to assert: there almost is order already» [21, p. 7].

D. Kosztolányi, who fought hard against censorship, writing about the above-mentioned

* lat. – a language used for communication between groups of people who speak different languages.

desire for peace in the summer of 1917, mentioned that in the atmosphere of war and propaganda, the main human values were turned upside down. In coffeehouses, in the House of Representatives and in the squares, «they argue that peace is disgusting, cursed, rotten, and war is sweet, high, testing. Peace also needs advertising. At one time, war was also loudly advertised, with pipes and drums, schnapps, flowers, speeches and poisonous articles. Human thinking and the noble instinct for life had to be turned back, in the opposite direction. Therefore, white became black, and black became white» [19, p. 1-2].

Therefore, the culture of war in Hungary was initially spread not by the top propaganda institutions (which did not even exist), but by the intellectuals, who assumed the «role of voluntary propagandist». The mobilization of the intellectuals was most characteristic during the first years, that is, before the «start of the war.» As some Hungarian authors note, mutual hatred gave literature, art and even science opportunities for experimentation. The expectation that the war would change culture and art was so strong that from the beginning of the war these changes were studied [5].

In voluntary mobilization, as in other areas, the main breakout occurred in 1916 or 1917. In the second half of 1916, the sudden decline in military enthusiasm probably coincided with the experiences of the «heaps of corpses after Verdun, Somme and the Brusylov's offensive», but the death of the emperor Franz Joseph in November 1916, as well as the new policy of the imperial heir Karl IV, «personally an extremely benevolent ruler who intended to end the war and was therefore ready to make changes».

On the eve of mobilization, at the beginning of hostilities, enthusiastic crowds demonstrating support for the war on the great boulevards of Budapest also strongly emphasized the fact that several generations grew up without any experience of the bloody reality of wars, and the real consequences of armed conflicts that dragged on for a long period of time and mostly transformed to trench warfare. «For at least two generations, those who live in Hungary have not faced war and what war can cause.» The slow process of awakening (based on estimates up to the present day) took on wider social dimensions only after the death of half a million Hungarian soldiers. Meanwhile, the intellectuals for the most part began to reject the war, and its active part, which sought to end the conflict as soon as possible, began to think about establishing a «closed but responsible alliance» [16, p. 116].

As already mentioned, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, being the second largest country in Europe after the Russian Empire on the eve of the First World War, also included lands with Slavic ethnic groups, which made up the majority of its population. However, these lands in their socio-economic section were mainly agrarian ones, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, which, occupying 1/5 of the territory and having a quarter of the population, accounted for almost 70 % of the entire industry of the former monarchy with a large export potential, in particular weapons. As it is well known, the information society appeared precisely in the bowels of the industrial world, a sign of which was already pluralistic print mass media. Therefore, not only industry, but also the presence of the national industrial proletariat and industrialists in Czechoslovakia determined the specifics of the implementation of military information policy in this part of the empire, which later affected the outcome of the war. In addition, the Czechoslovak legions occupy an almost legendary place in Czech history. They include the armed forces that fought during and after the First World War on the side of the Entente in the struggle for independent Czechoslovakia.

At the beginning of the 20th century the Czech press belonged to political parties (agrarian, national-democratic, social-democratic, etc.). With the beginning of the war, the Austrian censorship monitored not only the content of the press, but also images and graphic editorial. Newspapers and magazines had a very limited source of information and at the same time received edited articles that editors had to pass off as their own. News from abroad was received by the «Wolf» press service, but intelligence information was not entirely reliable. Newspapers could only publish reports on individual days and weeks of the war, small reports, feuilletons, Sunday supplements, etc. The press was loyal to the Habsburg Monarchy until 1917, after which anti-Austrian articles and themes appeared. Clericals and old-regime layers remained loyal to the Monarchy.

On October 28, 1918, in Prague, at the editorial board of «*Národní politika*» («People's Politics») on Wenceslas Square, the text of the note was pronounced, which the public understood as the actual capitulation of the Habsburg Monarchy. This news spurred people to spontaneous demonstrations that led to the declaration of Czechoslovakia's independence.

The history of independent Czechoslovakia began to be written in 1918. The history of

editorship in Czechoslovakia is also a history of power, political upheavals, and efforts to maintain control over disseminated information. In Czechoslovakia's short eighty-year history, editorship, both institutional and non-institutional one, has always appeared, but most prominently during times of lack of freedom, whether under Nazi occupation or under one-party rule. It can be argued that for more than half of its «historical life», Czechoslovakia was under the rule of some totalitarian government. The form and methods of editorship practice in certain periods differed somewhat, but in some ways they turned out to be the same.

The Czechoslovak Republic was established on October 28, 1918. On this day, the so-called Washington Declaration, or the declaration of independence of the Czechoslovak people by its provisional government, was published. Leading representatives of emigration (T. G. Masaryk, E. Beneš, M. R. Stefanik) in it, among other things, pledged that the new Czechoslovak state would ensure freedom of the press, freedom of speech, assembly, etc. The issue of freedom of the press became increasingly acute, because the law on the press and the legal norms regulating the publication of periodicals were mostly learned from the times of Austria-Hungary, and also from the very beginning were very closely connected with editorship [4, pp. 88-90].

On the other hand, propaganda in independent Czechoslovakia did not disappear, but on the contrary, it acquired an external direction for the promotion of pro-independence narratives among the world community. If in 1914 only a handful of enthusiasts promoted the idea of independence, then during the next four years the situation slowly but surely changed. The arrival of the new Emperor Charles I in 1917, the partial easing of editorship and the resumption of the work of the Viennese parliament, found the Czechs and Slovaks in completely different moods than at the beginning of the war. Diplomatic successes abroad and victories of Czechoslovak legionnaires on the front fields significantly strengthened Czechoslovak self-awareness and identity. Representatives of cultural circles issued a joint manifesto to their deputies, in which they called to defend Czecho-Slovak rights.

It was T. Masaryk who was convinced that the only correct way for the country, which had to find itself in the middle of war-torn Europe, was massive propaganda and diplomatic pressure. While the future president established contacts first in Italy, and later in Geneva and London, work did not stop in Prague itself either. The internal structure of the resistance movement was organized in the future capital of Czechoslovakia. The organization received the telling name «Maffie». Its main task was to collect information and transfer data abroad. Separately, members of the «Maffie» engaged in conspiratorial propaganda, in particular through their own connections in the local press. The Austrian police did not manage to uncover the organization until the collapse of the empire in 1918.

In the direction of foreign propaganda, the magazine «La Nation Tcheque» began to be published in Switzerland for the French-speaking public. At the same time, a magazine in the Czech language was also planned - «Československá sokratnost», which was supposed to promote the idea of independence among emigrants in Europe. Meanwhile, propaganda reached a qualitatively new level. T. Masaryk persistently lectured on the threat of pan-Germanism and met with European politicians. In London, a weekly magazine in English «The New Europe» began to be published. Already in November of the following year, the Czechoslovak independents founded the Czechoslovak Press Office (Československá tisková kancelář, ČTK), which gradually provided the Western media with information about events in Austria-Hungary.

Despite all the efforts of Czech and Slovak politicians, the real prospects looked rather vague. Everything changed in 1917 and drastic geopolitical changes: the fall of autocracy in Russia and the US declaration of war on Germany [2].

Regarding the military information policy of the next member of the Central Powers, the *Ottoman Empire*, contemporary Turkish authors, in particular, note the following. Although infrastructural deficiencies such as low literacy and underdeveloped means of communication and transportation particularly limited the impact of written propaganda in the Ottoman Empire, the Committee of Unity and Progress (hereafter CUP) effectively used propaganda on the home front throughout the war for three main goals: to support mobilization; justify the internal policy; and suppress through editorship any kind of opposition deemed harmful to the war effort [18, p. 21].

In the Ottoman Empire, no special official bodies were created to organize propaganda. The Ministry of War (Harbiye Nezareti) and under its leadership the General Staff (Erkan-i Harbiye-i Umumiye Riyaseti) were the main state institutions that organized and coordinated

such activities, especially regarding military matters. The military government thus monopolized the press and, in the absence of any opposition voices, gained additional power to control and direct the home front through limited and biased information. In early August 1914, in order to gain complete control over the press, the Ministry of the Interior, led by Talat Pasha (1874-1921), planned to close all newspapers except "Tanin", the semi-official publication of the CUP. As this was an extremely radical attempt even under martial law, the War Ministry, on the advice of Kazim Karabekir, decided to impose censorship regulations rather than try to close down all the newspapers.

Taking into account, as already mentioned, the rather significant illiteracy of the population, oral propaganda was carried out from the beginning of the war. In particular, religious speeches and sermons in mosques with appeals to the population to contribute to mobilization by all material and moral means constituted an essential component of oral propaganda. However, oral propaganda was not limited to this. In Istanbul and other provinces, semi-official organizations and the CUP itself organized many patriotic conferences and public addresses to educate the people about the importance of their support for the war process.

In August 1914, magazines and newspapers published numerous pro-war articles arguing that the war was the Ottoman Empire's chance to survive. Such indoctrination led the masses to attend pro-war demonstrations organized by the CUP, especially in Istanbul. When the empire entered the war alongside the Central Powers, nationalist propaganda was based on a clear definition of the «internal enemy» (the non-Muslim Ottomans who were reluctant to support mobilization) and the «external enemy» (the Allies) states and their citizens) also acquired an Islamist undertone. Thus, CUP propaganda targeting Muslim Turks conflated Islamism with nationalism. In fact, the military government used jihadi propaganda, which included nationalist elements, not only to ensure the regular mobilization of Anatolian Muslims, but also to publicly endorse a series of domestic policies directed against non-Muslim citizens of the Ottoman Empire, including the forced migration of Anatolian Armenians. At the same time as the official rhetoric, based on the salvation of the state and religion, marginalized non-Muslims in the eyes of Muslim Turks, it turned out that people supported or were indifferent to the hostile policy of the CUP against Armenians and Ottoman Greeks [7, p. 62].

The CUP government promoted the idea that mobilizing resources to ensure the survival of the empire was the sacred duty of all citizens. Soldiers on all fronts had to be ready to sacrifice their lives if necessary. In return for their altruism, the people in the rear would undoubtedly support the mobilization. Military propaganda based on the themes of «duty» and «sacrifice» was mainly aimed at three social groups, mostly Turkish or non-Turkish Muslims: soldiers at the front, young men of conscription age, and women facing the hardships of war on the «home front».

But as the war dragged on, the horrors and sacrifices of war became more real than official rhetoric and promises for the future. Since 1917, propaganda began to lose its influence on the domestic front. While young men were unwilling to submit to the self-sacrificing demands of wartime propaganda, women who faced the realities of wartime were also on a different stage, making them unresponsive to patriotic messages. As a result, realizing the deterioration of conditions at home, many soldiers inevitably became deserters in order to take better care of their families [11].

Concluding the examination of the peculiarities of the information policy of the Central Powers during the First World War, it should be generally stated that some German researchers considered the contradiction between the outdated European borders and the national principle of state formation to be an equally important cause of the First World War. As a result, the biggest mistake for the Kaiser's Germany was its support to the imperial Austria-Hungary and Turkey, which sought to preserve the rule over the colonized peoples [1, c. 401].

Conclusions. What has been stated about the information policy of the Central Powers during the First World War allows us to state the following.

1) the object of propaganda in all states participating in the First World War was mainly external forces - enemy states. Instead, the main consumer of this propaganda was a domestic audience, especially in the Central Powers (with the exception of Czechoslovakia after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) due to a lack of resources to spread their own propaganda narratives abroad. According to Manichean argumentation*, the propagandists

* Manichaeism is the Iranian dualistic teaching of Mani about the struggle between good and evil,

claimed that their country was fighting for civilization against enemies who were nothing more than a pack of barbarians. For example, the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1941) declared on August 8, 1914: «The struggle against Germany is the struggle of civilization against barbarism.» The Central Powers used the same argument against Russia. When the Western Allies, later joined by American President Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924), declared a struggle for personal freedom and world democracy against German militarism and «Kaiserism», the Germans retaliated decisively. In several cases, professors and writers denied the atrocities in Belgium and affirmed the unity of militarism and culture [10]. That is, each side presented this war to its citizens and neutral countries as a civilizational war, and that it was this state and its allies who stood on the watch of civilization in its own sense. This thesis further led to the current kind of civilizational and mental impasse, when one side puts a person and his life in the center of attention, the other sees a person as a means of strengthening an expansionist aggressive state that tries to enslave free, democratic nations;

2) the propaganda used during the First World War also had large-scale consequences; totalitarian dictatorships of the 20th century would learn the lessons of the Great Wars in improving their own propaganda. For example, on March 25, 1933, Goebbels, addressing the management of German radio companies, outlined the strategy of his Ministry of Propaganda based on the axiom that «propaganda was in the hands of our enemies in the world war, the most powerful weapon»; therefore, the newly created ministry should «carry out a mental mobilization in Germany», which he then compared to the activities of the Ministry of Defense, suggesting that this mental mobilization may be even more important than the physical arming of the people;

3) the propaganda that unfolded in the interior during the First World War did not cause much resistance inside the country. In summary, it may be argued that during the period under review, writers and journalists, and the pacifism they espoused, were long ineffective in the face of spectacular methods of propaganda operations. But at first, neither pacifism nor common sense could stop the mobilization impulse in any of the belligerent states without exception.

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ABSTRACT

This article continues the cycle of publications highlighting problems of restriction of the right to information, countering enemy propaganda and promoting one's own ideologies and narratives as elements of counter-propaganda.

The object of propaganda in all states participating in the First World War was mainly external forces – enemy states. Instead, the main consumer of this propaganda was a domestic audience, especially in the Central Powers (with the exception of Czechoslovakia after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) due to a lack of resources to spread their own propaganda narratives abroad.

The peculiarity of the information policy of the Central Powers, in contrast to those considered in the previous article (Great Britain, France, the USA), is determined by the fact that they, being land empires, faced a number of difficulties caused primarily by their polyethnic composition, which ultimately led to their defeat and disintegration into separate states as one of the main results of this war.

Keywords: media, World War I, Central Powers, society, censorship, propaganda, restrictions on the right to information.